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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 54 SUMMER 1980 NUMBER 4
IMPEACHMENT OF PARTIAL VERDICTS
DAmu J. KORNSTEIN*
In law, as in life, we sometimes must cope with difficult situa-
tions. Experience often helps us to cope, and we tend to assume,
perhaps more than we should, that most of the basic and more
common situations have occurred before and can be met from the
fund of experience. Occasionally we come across a situation that
seems to be one that should have occurred before, that should fit
into the teachings of experience, that should have a neat, ready
and established solution, but for some reason fails to do any of
these things. Precisely such an unusually "difficult and novel situa-
tion"1 is presented by repudiation of a partial verdict 2 by a crimi-
nal jury.
Partial verdicts are a common event in federal criminal trials,
but repudiation of such verdicts, even though it involves the inter-
section of two established procedural devices, is a new problem for
the law. Seemingly authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal
* J.D. Yale University 1973, B.S. City College of New York 1968. The author acted as
assigned appellate counsel for indigent Charles Petri, one of the defendants in United States
v. Hockridge, 573 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
1 United States v. Hockridge, 573 F.2d 752, 760 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821
(1978).
'See notes 92-94 and accompanying text infra. Although a separate verdict should be
returned with respect to each count and defendant in a criminal jury trial, it is permissible
for the jury to return a partial verdict at any point in their deliberations as to those issues
upon which agreement has been reached. See notes 142-46 and accompanying text infra.
See generally 2 C. WRIGHr, FEDEAmL PACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 513, at 368 (1969). Thus, a
trial court properly may accept the verdict of a jury as to one issue, while declaring a mis-
trial as to a different issue to which no jury agreement could be reached. See United States
v. DeLaughter, 453 F.2d 908, 910 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972). Similarly, it
has been held permissible for a jury to deliberate on several counts, return a verdict as to
some of them, and then retire to redeliberate on the remaining counts. See United States v.
Barash, 412 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832 (1969).
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Procedure,3 partial verdicts provide a useful way for judges and
juries to whittle away at complex criminal cases involving more
than one count or more than one defendant. Less common per-
haps, but even more well established, is impeachment of a jury ver-
dict. A verdict can be impeached either before or after it becomes
final, with the standards for impeachment after finality being
much more strenuous than before finality.
4
In October 1978 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the
first and only case to raise squarely the issues surrounding the in-
terface between partial verdicts and their repudiation. 5 The central
question in United States v. Hockridge6 was whether or not a trial
court should have set aside a partial verdict of guilt on the first of
several counts upon the jury's spontaneous and voluntary repudia-
tion of the partial verdict after it was recorded but before delibera-
tions on other counts were concluded and before the jury was dis-
charged.7 Conceding that it was dealing with a case of first
impression, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found no
error and held that a recorded partial verdict is as final as a com-
plete verdict after jury discharge.8
The affirmance by the Second Circuit and the denial of certio-
rari by the Supreme Court do not end the matter for all time. Of
course those decisions did resolve the status of the particular ap-
peal. But members of the Supreme Court itself have told us that a
denial of certiorari means nothing more than that fewer than four
justices were willing to hear the case and that it foreshadows no
opinion on the merits.9 After all, where the issue is one of first
impression or one perceived as unlikely of repetition, as may be
the case with repudiation of partial verdicts prior to jury discharge,
the Court may be inclined to let the issue percolate among the
lower courts, allowing judicial wisdom to accumulate, conflicts to
develop, or the problem to go away, before agreeing to take it on.10
It is fair to say, then, that the questions stirred by repudiation
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(b); notes 112-16 and accompanying text infra.
See generally notes 43-91 and accompanying text infra.
'United States v. Hockridge, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
8 573 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
Id. at 758; see notes 164-167 and accompanying text infra.
8 Id. at 759-60.
See, e.g., Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917-18 (1950)(opinion of
Frankfurter, J., respecting denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
10 Id. at 918. See generally Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 1227 (1979).
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of partial verdicts prior to jury discharge are unresolved, very
much alive, and worthy of careful study. The ultimate nature of
partial verdicts is implicated, together with the whole purpose and
process of jury impeachment. Also at stake, at least in part, is the
integrity of the guilt-determining process, the fair performance .of
the vital functions of a federal criminal jury, and public confidence
in its result. Lurking not too far in the background are basic issues
surrounding a criminal defendant's constitutional rights.
I. THE PROBLEMS POSED: THE Hockridge CASE
The facts in Hockridge vividly pose the problems surrounding
impeachment of partial verdicts. In 1976, a federal grand jury in
the Southern District of New York indicted four persons on one
conspiracy count and twenty-three separate counts of misapplying
bank funds, making false statements to influence conduct by a fed-
erally insured bank, and making false bank entries."' The trial
before District Judge Dudley Bonsal and a jury of twelve lasted
eight weeks, with many witnesses testifying.
12
To the extent the jury instructions are relevant, they con-
tained what is known as a "modified Pinkerton" charge, that is, a
charge that may make conviction of the substantive counts contin-
gent upon conviction on the conspiracy count.13 In effect Judge
11 573 F.2d at 754-55.
12 Id. at 754. Appellants Hockridge, Petri and Easton were convicted of conspiring (1)
to misapply bank funds, (2) to employ false financial statements to obtain bank loans, and
(3) to make false entries in the bank's books. Id. They were also convicted of a substantive
count of misapplying and assisting in the misapplication of bank funds. Id. Petri was also
convicted on a substantive count charging him with preparing a false financial statement for
the purpose of obtaining a loan. Id.
"3 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 642-43 (1946). The Pinkerton Court
held that acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy may be attributed to co-conspirators, so
that membership in the conspiracy may result in criminal liability for the conspiracy as well
as for all substantive offenses committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 647. See
generally W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, JR., CRmnNAL LAW § 65, at 513 (1972).
In Hockridge, Judge Bonsai charged the jury.
One other word, ladies and gentlemen, regarding all of these substantive
counts. The government is contending here and the defendants deny this, that all
of the crimes listed in these substantive counts were really in furtherance of the
conspiracy charged in Count 1.
I have asked you to consider Count 1 first. You remember when I reviewed
the conspiracy count with you it charges among the purposes of a conspiracy was
the misapplication of funds, making of false financial statements, making of false
white sheets.
If you find in Count 1 that there was a conspiracy here, and if you find on the
substantive count the person [who] did it - Hockridge, in this case, for instance,
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Bonsal told the jury: If you find someone guilty of conspiracy, then
you may, for that reason alone, find him guilty of a substantive
count too.
The possible interdependence between verdicts on the con-
spiracy and substantive counts becomes significant in light of the
sequence in which the jury rendered its verdicts. After deliberating
for a day and a half, the jury, in response to questioning by the
trial judge, announced that it had reached a verdict as to three
defendants on the conspiracy count.1' Despite objections by de-
fense counsel, Judge Bonsal took the partial verdict of guilt.15 Al-
though the jury was polled, a separate poll was not taken of each
juror as to each of the three defendants.16 After polling the jury
and recording the partial verdict, Judge Bonsal sent the jury back
to continue its deliberations as to the remaining counts.1
During the morning of the very next day, Juror Number Four
sent a note to' Judge Bonsal requesting to see him. Judge Bonsal
failed to disclose receipt of Juror Number Four's note until 5:00
p.m. on the day it was received. Judge Bonsal, after consulting
counsel, decided not to see Juror Number Four. 8 At 10:00 a.m. the
next day, Judge Bonsal told counsel that he had received a note
from Juror Number Three. She asked to speak with the judge,
in the white sheets, or the person who filed a false statement, - was a member of
the conspiracy, and if you have found that the defendant you are considering was
also a member of the conspiracy, - and if you have found that the substantive
count, - the misapplication of funds, the false statements, the white sheets -
that these things were done in furtherance of the conspiracy, then you may find
the defendant you are considering guilty under the substantive count.
Record at 5835-36, United States v. Hockridge, 573 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
821 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Record].
14 573 F.2d at 757.
1" Record at 5931-34.
1" See FED. R. Cram. P. 31(d); note 75 infra. But see United States v. Mathis, 535 F.2d
1303 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam). Although the Mathis court permitted a single poll for
multiple defendants, it emphasized that the trial lasted only one day and was uncompli-
cated. Id. at 1307. The court went on to note that, for trials involving several defendants,
separate polls as to each of the defendants might be preferable to avoid jury confusion. Id.
17 573 F.2d at 757. After the verdict has been returned, the jury may be polled if or-
dered by the court on its own motion, but must be polled if any of the parties so requests.
See 8A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTCnE 1 31.07, at 31-62 (2d ed. 1979). If the jury is to be
polled, each member of the jury must then be asked if he agrees with the verdict as re-
turned. The purpose of a jury poll is to allow the court and the parties to determine with
certainty that the verdict was actually unanimous. Should the poll reveal that the verdict
was not in fact unanimous, the jury may either be discharged or sent to retire for further
deliberations. See id. at 63.
18 573 F.2d at 757; Record at 5909-15.
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"fearing that she had committed a 'grave injustice' by rushing into
the verdict."1 Judge Bonsal refused to set aside the partial ver-
dict, but decided to interview Jurors Number Three and Number
Four.20 On being interviewed in chambers without counsel present,
Juror Number Three indicated that she "felt that there was not
enough evidence to make me decide that Mr. Hockridge and Mr.
Petri were involved in a conspiracy." 21 Juror Number Four indi-
cated that during the deliberations she "was personally attacked
incredibly by two members [of the jury]. 22 Judge Bonsai refused
to permit her to describe the nature of the attack.28 Juror Number
Four also pointed out that she and several other jurors were "rail-
roaded, you know, before we could bring our doubts... I know
that all the time we were polled that I should have said no."'
Judge Bonsai then instructed the jurors to resume delibera-
tions, adding that "perhaps after we finish here I will want to see
you again. "25 It then became known that at least one other juror
had repudiated the partial verdict.26
After this meeting with Jurors Number Three and Number
Four, Judge Bonsai never charged the jury as a whole to deliberate
anew on the conspiracy count.27 Nor did Judge Bonsai inform the
11 573 F.2d at 757; Record at 5920. The note was startling.
Judge Bonsai, please see me as soon as possible this morning. I feel that I have
committed a grave injustice. Inasmuch as I let myself be let or rushed for lack of a
better word into agreeing with the verdict of the jury. I'm sorry for having let this
matter continue as long as I have.
See id. at 5921, 5923.
20 Id. at 5921.
21 573 F.2d at 757.
22 Record at 5929.
23 Id. at 5930.
2, Id. at 5930-31. The following colloquy subsequently took place between the court and
Juror Number Three:
You have had sort of an emotional problem with this thing here, haven't you?
JUROR NO. 3: It can be an emotional problem but the question in my mind is the
reasonable doubt...
THE COURT: I think what I would like to do is this. You know, I mentioned to
you when I charged you I don't want you ever to surrender your honest convic-
tions because of other jurors.
JUROR NO. 3: That is what I did.
THE COURT: You think you did.
JUROR NO. 3: I feel that I did. I surrendered myself because of verbal attack.
Id.
25 Id. at 5931-34.
26 Id.
27 573 F.2d at 757.
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jury as a whole of the substance of the interview.2 8 He never met
again with Jurors Number Three and Number Four, despite his
promise to do so, and he never repolled the jury as to the conspir-
acy count.2 9 The defendants subsequently moved for a mistrial but
Judge Bonsai denied the motion, saying he was "satisfied that
neither of the two jurors surrendered their honest convictions."' 0
Thereafter the jury found three defendants guilty on the misappli-
cation count, and one defendant guilty of one false statement
count.3' After the jury rendered its verdicts on thirteen of the
twenty-four counts, Judge Bonsal dismissed the remaining counts
and discharged the jury.32
All of the convicted defendants appealed, arguing that Judge
Bonsal had improperly let stand the partial verdict on the conspir-
acy count.3 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the convictions unanimously, recognizing that it was charting new
territory.8 5 The court held that a duly recorded partial verdict is as
final as a complete verdict after jury discharge.36
The Second Circuit justified its affirmance on two grounds.
First it pointed out that impeachment of partial verdicts impinges
28 Id. Judge Bonsal's discussion with jurors Three and Four occurred during an on-the-
record in camera interview. Id.
29 Id.
"o United States v. Hockridge, No. 76-843 (S.D.N.Y. April 12, 1977) (order denying mo-
tion by certain defendants to set aside the verdict).
31 573 F.2d at 754.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 758. The Hockridge appellants also asserted that indications of jury bias were
evident early in the trial. On the fifth day of the trial, one of the jurors informed Judge
Bonsai that several of the other jurors had made remarks concerning the defendants' guilt.
Id. at 756. The judge then interviewed each member of the panel individually. Several of
them professed ignorance of the statements; however, six reported that although a "passing
reference" to guilt had been made in their presence, they were of the opinion that it had
been made in jest. Id. Each juror then stated that he would refrain from forming an opinion
on the issue of guilt until all the evidence had been presented. Judge Bonsai then concluded
that the jury was not prejudiced, and continued the trial. Id. On appeal, the issue of jury
prejudice was dismissed by the court, which noted that the decision by the trial judge to
continue the trial was a valid exercise of his discretionary power. Id.
"I Id. at 761. Hockridge was decided by Circuit Judges Oakes and Van Graafeiland and
District Judge Bartels of the Eastern District of New York, who was sitting by designation.
Id. at 754.
"2 Id. at 759-60. The court of appeals knew it was mapping unfamiliar ground, that it
was faced with a case of first impression, for it wrote: "Neither the cases nor the treatises
definitively answer the question whether rule 606(b) [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] bars
impeachment of a partial verdict by the voluntary and spontaneous testimony of a juror
prior to the jury's discharge." Id. at 758.
36 Id. at 759.
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on the freedom of jury deliberation.3 7 The second ground for deci-
sion was the interest in verdict finality.38 Despite its awareness of
"appellant's" purported distinction between impeachment of com-
plete verdicts on the one hand and partial verdicts followed by
continuing deliberation on the other,"' 9 the court of appeals con-
cluded that "[a] recorded partial verdict ought not to be disturbed
absent a showing of the type which would permit impeachment of
a complete verdict."' 0 The court of appeals denied a petition for
rehearing and rehearing en banc,' 1 and the Supreme Court denied
the defendants' petitions for certiorari. 2
II. IMPEACHMENT OF VERDICTS GENERALLY
The Nonimpeachment Rule
Impeaching a jury verdict has never been easy, though it has
always been possible.' 3 Anglo-American jurisprudence has consist-
ently recognized that the proper functioning of our jury system de-
pends on verdicts being regarded as ultimate decisions." In partic-
ular, courts have noted three primary and distinct interests served
by not allowing jury verdicts to be impeached. First, protection
must be given to the public interest in the secrecy of jury delibera-
tions, in which frankness and freedom are too necessary to be dis-
couraged.45 Second, finality, certainty, and stability of the verdict
are needed for administrative convenience and expediency in ter-
17 Id.; see notes 45 & 169 and accompanying text infra.
Id.; see notes 191-95 and accompanying text infra.
3" Id. at 758.
40 Id. at 759-60. For a discussion of the type of showing that would permit impeach-
ment of a complete verdict, see notes 60-81 and accompanying text infra.
41 No. 77-1243 (2d Cir. May 13, 1978).
42 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
3 See, e.g., Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785), discussed at note 48 infra.
4" See generally United States v. Hockridge, 573 F.2d at 759 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 821 (1978); Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1247 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); 6A J. MooRE, supra note 17, 1 59.08[4], at 59-130 to 31;
SA J. MooRE, supra note 17, 31.08[1] at 31-67.
41 See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933)("Freedom of debate might be stifled
and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and
ballots were to be freely published to the world."); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68
(1915)("the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the
constant subject of public investigation-to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of
discussion and conference"); Rex v. Armstrong, [Eng. 1922] 2 K.B. 555, 568; notes 169-173
and accompanying text infra. For a general review of the entire subject, see Comment, Im-
peachment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. CH. L. REv. 360 (1958).
1980]
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minating the controversy.4 Third, jurors must be safeguarded
against postverdict harassment and tampering.4 Underlying these
three primary interests are two other, more amorphous notions:
Lord Mansfield's old maxim that a juror is somehow incompetent
to impeach a verdict in which he took part,48 and a "floodgates"
argument based on the fear that making impeachment easy would
produce "countless allegations of error. '49 For all of these reasons,
41 See United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 664 (2d Cir. 1978), where the court stated:
"Certain limits on... inquiry into jury verdicts are necessary in the interest of finality lest
judges 'become Penelopes, forever engaged in unraveling the webs they wove.'" (The Pene-
lope metaphor comes from Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.)
(L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947)). See notes 191-195 and accompanying text
infra. At least one court has noted that if postverdict inquiries into the motives behind juror
decisions were permitted, the courts might be subjected to "large numbers of applications
mostly without real merit." United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 950 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 984 (1962); see also United States v. Grieco, 161 F. Supp. 683, 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Carlson & Sumberg, Attacking Jury Verdicts: Paradigms for Rule Revi-
sion, 1977 ARmz. ST. L.J. 247, 250-51.
47 "[T]he proper functioning of the jury system requires that the courts protect jurors
from being 'harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evi-
dence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.'" United
States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 664 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S: 264,
267 (1915)). See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-49 (1892); United States v.
Eagle, 539 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1110 (1977); United States
v. Green, 523 F.2d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976); Government
of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148-50 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917
(1976); Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Crosby, 294
F.2d 928, 950 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 984 (1962); notes 214-217 and accompa-
nying text infra.
" This maxim was an innovation introduced in Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944
(K.B. 1785). In Vaise, affidavits of jurors stating that their verdict was based on chance were
rejected, with Lord Mansfield saying:
The court cannot receive such an affidavit from any of the jurymen themselves, in
all of whom such conduct is a very high misdemeanor, but in overy such case the
court must derive their knowledge from some other source, such as from some
person having seen the transaction through a window, or by some other means.
Id. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 68, at 148 n.80 (2d ed. 1972). Lord Mansfield's holding
was a corollary of his doctrine that no one shall be heard to assert his own turpitude. See 8
J. WmIMOR, EVIDENCE § 2352 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). But see notes 54-58 and accom-
panying text infra.
49 8A J. MooRE, supra note 17, 31.08, at 31-67. See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264,
267 (1915), where the Court said:
But let it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned
into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part
in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an
inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding.
Id.
Wigmore offers an additional reason based on the parol evidence rule. According to
Wigmore, the verdict is a jural act that controls over any subsequent parol evidence. 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 48 at § 2349.
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courts have been reluctant to allow jury verdicts to be impeached
unnecessarily.50
At the same time, it has been recognized that in some situa-
tions justice may demand that verdicts be impeached.5 1 The choice
is between preserving the interests in nonimpeachment"2 and re-
dressing the injury to the litigant.5 3 Eminent commentators have
referred to Lord Mansfield's hoary shibboleth about juror incom-
petency as an "absurdity"" and a "gross over-simplification. 55 Ac-
cording to Learned Hand, "The whole subject has been obscured,
apparently beyond hope of clarification, by Lord Mansfield's often
quoted language .. ."56 Professor Moore believes the nonim-
peachment rule is "difficult to justify on theoretical, or conceptual
grounds. '57 The cases themselves reveal "a discernible trend to-
ward broadening the exceptions to the nonimpeachment rule."'58
Impeachment's Three Variables
Today every jury verdict may, under certain circumstances, be
impeached. The relevant circumstances include three main vari-
ables, in large part derived from the primary interests sought to be
protected by the nonimpeachment rule.59 These variables may be
accurately described as the nature of the grounds for impeach-
ment, the method by which those grounds become known, and the
timing of the assertion of those grounds. Whether or not a jury
verdict will be impeached thus depends on what the grounds for
50 See, e.g., Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 439 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D. Wis. 1977), rev'd per
curiam on other grounds, 590 F.2d 215 (1978) (verdict will not be impeached even though
juror's letter indicated jury misunderstood the applicable law of comparative negligence).
See also 8A J. MoOR, supra note 17, 1 31.08, at 31-67.
51 See, e.g., McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. at 268-69; United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 361, 366 (1851). In Reid, the Supreme Court said: "[C]ases might arise in which it
would be impossible to refuse [evidence from jurors impeaching a verdict] without violating
the plainest principles of justice." 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 366.
52 See notes 43-50 and accompanying text supra.
6A J. MooR, supra note 17, 59.08[04], at 59-143 to -144.
J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVMENCE 887 (5th ed. 1965).
55 H.R. Doc. 93-46, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 98, 99 (1973). The weaknesses in Lord Mans-
field's position are pointed out in 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 48, at § 2352-2353.
Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
764 (1947).
57 8A J. MOORE, supra note 17, 1 31.08[1][a], at 31-68.
"Id. at n.10 (quoting ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTIcE, ABA STAN-
DARDS RELATING To TRIAL By JURY, § 5.7, commentary at 165 (Approved Draft 1968)).
5 See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
19801
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:663
impeachment are, how they become known, and when they become
known. With respect to each variable, there is a sliding scale along
which impeachment becomes more or less justifiable in light of the
relevant policy considerations.
What substantive grounds provide the basis for impeachment
are related to the interest in freedom of jury deliberations and the
notion of juror incompetency. At one end of the spectrum are
claims that extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention, 0 that outside influence was im-
properly brought to bear on jurors,"' or that irregularities occurred
outside the jury room.62 Such claims are always cognizable by a
court in considering whether or not to impeach a verdict.63 Thus
rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly permits a
juror to testify "on the question whether extraneous prejudicial in-
formation was improperly brought to a juror's attention or whether
any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror.""
At the other end of the spectrum, by contrast, are the forbid-
den inquiries into the mental operations and emotional reactions
of jurors in arriving at a given result.6 5 Rule 606(b), for example,
60 Extraneous prejudicial information can take the form of statements to jurors by
court personnel, e.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
466 (1965); United States ex rel. Tobe v. Bensinger, 492 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Brumbaugh, 471 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973); Richardson
v. United States, 360 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1966), or prejudicial newspaper or radio accounts,
e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140
(1892); United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. McKinney,
429 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 922 (1971); United States v. Kum Seng
Seo, 300 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962).
6" See, e.g., Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954); Bailey v. United States, 410
F.2d 1209 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 933 (1969); United States v. Gersh, 328 F.2d 460
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 992 (1964).
62 E.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 143 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 1883 (1980) (defense counsel claimed juror "raised his middle finger in a sign generally
recognized to be the antithesis of approval and indicated by an expression on his face"
distaste for counsel). In this group are cases where the jury improperly considered evidence
not admitted in court. E.g., United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Farese v. United States, 428 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.
1970); Stiles v. Lawrie, 211 F.2d 188, 190 (6th Cir. 1954); People v. De Lucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275,
229 N.E.2d 211, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1967).
61 See 8A J. MooRE, supra note 17, 31.08[1], at 31-67 & n.5.
64 FED. R. EvID. 606(b).
5 Id.; see note 68 infra. See, e.g., McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); Mattox v.
United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148 (1892); Holden v. Porter, 405 F.2d 878 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 934 (1969).
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prohibits a juror from testifying "as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the ef-
fect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict. . or con-
cerning his mental processes in connection therewith."6 6 Though
often couched in terms of juror incompetence, the modern rules
forbidding such inquiries into jury deliberations actually amount
to significant substantive limitations on the possible grounds for
impeachment, 67 thereby shrouding a veritable host of events rele-
vant to the accuracy, meaningfulness, and integrity of the factfind-
ing process.es Somewhere in between these two extremes are claims
" FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
" See, e.g., People v. Howard, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 2, 1979, at 6, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
Jan. 25, 1979).
" Examples of the conduct of jurors which has been hidden include: ignoring or misun-
derstanding instructions or interrogatories to jury; ignoring or misunderstanding the appli-
cable substantive law, e.g., Poches v. J.J. Newberry Co., 549 F.2d 1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 1977);
misusing any portion of the evidence in the case, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928,
949 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 984 (1962); Morgan v. Sun Oil Co., 109 F.2d 178,
180 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 640 (1940); holding it against the accused that he failed
to take the stand, e.g., United States v. DiCarlo, 575 F.2d 952, 960 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 834 (1978); improperly speculating on extra-record matters of common knowledge,
e.g., Gault v. Poor Sisters of St. Frances, 375 F.2d 539, 548-51 (6th Cir. 1967), such as the
impact of insurance upon the judgment (or of the judgment upon insurance rates), see
Holden v. Porter, 405 F.2d 878, 879 (10th Cir. 1969), or the impact of contingent fees, see
Gault v. Poor Sisters of St. Frances, 375 F.2d at 548-51, or the impact of taxes in the case,
see id.; improperly speculating that the trial court would suspend a sentence, that the ac-
cused would be released on probation, or that he would quickly be paroled, e.g., Klimes v.
United States, 263 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1959); compromising principles out of concern for
personal matters in order to make an early end of deliberations, e.g., Poches v. J.J. New-
berry Co., 549 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1977), or giving in to pressure from others and casting
their votes against their better judgment or without being truly persuaded, see United
States v. Blackburn, 446 F.2d 1089, 1090-91 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017
(1972); United States v. Schroeder, 433 F.2d 846, 851 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
943 (1971); being inattentive, sleeping, or thinking about other matters during trial or delib-
erations; erring in calculating the amount of an award, or miscasting votes in a tenor oppo-
site to that intended (although an error in reporting the verdict may be proved), or not
agreeing with or believing in the verdict, see, e.g., United States v. Gerardi, 586 F.2d 896,
898 (1st Cir. 1978), or that the verdict was the result of mistake or prejudice, see, e.g.,
Poches v. J.J. Newberry Co., 549 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1977); trading votes on one issue or as
to one party to get support of another juror as to some other issue or party, see, e.g., Stein v.
New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1953); Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 382-83 (1912);
agreeing on a limit for deliberations, see, e.g., Capella v. Baumgartner, 59 F.R.D. 312 (S.D.
Fla. 1973); misunderstanding the requirement of a unanimous decision, see, e.g., United
States v. Homer, 411 F. Supp. 972, 978 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977), or agreeing to abide by the vote of a majority, or of a number
less than necessary for a proper verdict, see Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d
432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947); and arriving at the sum to be awarded
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of irregularity inside the jury room such as gambling, coercion, or
other misconduct.6 9 In short, courts tend to assign different
weights to different substantive claims for setting aside a jury ver-
dict, depending on the perceived interference with the privacy and
freedom of jury deliberations.
How a court learns of alleged grounds for impeachment can be
quite significant and implicates two public policy considerations,
juror incompetency and protection of jurors from post-verdict im-
portuning. The venerable doctrine holding jurors incompetent to
impeach their own verdict means that courts are more favorably
disposed if the grounds for impeachment are brought to its atten-
tion by a nonjuror 0 or by circumstantial evidence. 1 But even if a
juror is the sole source of information, the interest in protecting
jurors from harassment and annoyance would seem not to apply to
spontaneous and voluntary statements by jurors. 2 As a result,
courts should be more sympathetic to unsolicited information sup-
plied by a juror than to affidavits, statements, or testimony pro-
cured from a juror by a lawyer or a litigant. Revelation resulting
from inquiry by the court perhaps stands on a different footing. In
any event, real differences exist, from a public policy perspective,
between spontaneous and voluntary statements by jurors on the
one hand, and solicited juror information on the other.
When the court discovers the alleged ground for impeachment
involves the interest in verdict finality and bears heavily on the
by adding together the amounts that each juror thought appropriate and dividing by the
number of jurors-rendering the classic quotient verdict, see McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S.
264 (1915).
" It has been recognized that the intoxication of a jury member to a degree sufficient to
impair his judgment may constitute misconduct serious enough to warrant a new trial. See
Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 415 (1874); See also Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d
432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947); Faith v. Neely, 41 F.R.D. 361, 366 (N.D.
W. Va. 1966); 8 J. WmMORE, supra note 48, § 2354; Note, To Impeach or Not to Impeach:
The Stability of Juror Verdicts in Federal Courts, 4 PEPPERDMNE L. REV. 343, 349 (1977).
Nor may a juror testify that the other members of the panel coerced him into reaching his
decision. See Johnson v. Hunter, 144 F.2d 565, 567 (10th Cir. 1944); 6A J. MooRE, supra
note 17, 1 59.0814], at 59-131. If a juror is coerced as a result of statements made by the
court, however, a mistrial may be declared. See note 198 infra.
1o E.g., Consolidated Rendering Co. v. New Haven Hotel Co., 300 F.2d 627 (D. Conn.
1924) (bailiff); Reich v. Thompson, 346 Mo. 577, 142 S.W.2d 486 (1940) (court clerk).
71 E.g., Central of Ga. Ry. v. Holmes, 223 Ala. 188, 134 So. 875 (1931) (papers in jury
room).
7' But see Domeracki v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1247 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971) (court lacks power to inquire into jury's decisional process
"even when information pertaining to the deliberations is volunteered by one of the
jurors").
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decision whether or not to set aside the verdict. Of course a court
is more prone to pay attention to the alleged ground for impeach-
ment if it is asserted earlier than later. If non-final, a verdict is
more open to attack; if final, a verdict is more difficult to im-
peach.73 There are, however, only four points in time worth consid-
ering as triggers for verdict finality-announcement of the ver-
dict,7 4 polling of the jury,75 recording of the verdict, and discharge
of the jury. Notwithstanding the other possibilities, the accepted
rule is that a verdict becomes final only after the jury is dis-
charged.76 According to Professor Moore, "the general proposition
is that after the jury has been discharged, jurors are not competent
to testify" about defects in the verdict," but that "there is nothing
in the policy underlying the no-impeachment rule" to preclude a
juror from so testifying "prior to the jury's discharge. '7 8 Wigmore
takes a similar position, finding that the reasons for the
nonimpeachment rule disappear if the investigation "takes place
before the jurors' discharge and separation. '7  Following the usual
rule, many cases hold that statements received after discharge may
not be received to impeach the verdict,80 but that statements, even
73 See notes 77-81 and accompanying text infra.
74 Verdicts in federal criminal jury trials must be delivered to the judge by the jury in
open court following the termination of their deliberations. See FED. R. CluM. P. 31(a).
7 After the return of a verdict in a federal criminal jury trial, but prior to the recorda-
tion of the verdict, the jury must be polled upon the request of any party, or by order of the
court on its own motion, FED. R. CriM. P. 31(d). The court must also provide the defendant
with a reasonable opportunity to request a jury polling. See Miranda v. United States, 255
F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1958). Should a jury poll reveal that the verdict was not unanimous, the
court may discharge the jury or send it back for further deliberations. FED. R. CIM. P.
31(d).
The jury poll provides each juror with the opportunity, prior to the recording of the
verdict, to assent in open court to the verdict that has been returned; all concerned may
thus ascertain that the verdict was in fact unanimous. In polling the jury, however, the court
must exercise caution to ensure that the individual jurors respond freely to the poll. There-
fore, should the poll reveal disagreement among the jurors, the court must refrain from
requesting any type of explanation, lest the dissenting jurors feel coerced into agreeing with
the majority. See United States v. Love, 597 F.2d 81, 83-84 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Sexton, 456 F.2d 961, 966-67 (5th Cir. 1972).
7' See notes 77-81 and accompanying text infra.
77 6A J. MOORE, supra note 17, 1 59.08[4], at 59-130 to -31.
78 Id. at 59-143.
7" 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 34, § 2350 (emphasis deleted). See generally 3 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, EVIDENcE § 606[01]-[05] (1975); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY, Commentary to § 5.7, at 164 (Approved Draft
1968).
8o See, e.g., Grace Lines v. Motley, 439 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v.
Schroeder, 433 F.2d 846, 851 & n.8 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); United
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statements about jurors' mental operations and emotional
processes, are acceptable before discharge.8'
These three variables - what, how, and when - should not
be studied in isolation. Only by examining each variable in relation
to the other variables can an intelligent decision on impeachment
be made. 2
When A Verdict Is Not A Verdict
A court can avoid the rigidities of the nonimpeachment rules
by finding that no "verdict" was reached."3 If a court finds that no
verdict was ever reached, it may accept a juror's statement regard-
ing some irregularity in the jury's decision. For example, in United
States v. Pleva,84 decided in 1933 by the Second Circuit, a juror
became seriously ill during deliberations and the trial court or-
dered him to be examined by two physicians, both of whom re-
ported that he was fit to continue deliberating. 5 Upon concluding
further deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.88 After
States v. Chereton, 309 F.2d 197, 200 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 936 (1963);
United States v. Grieco, 261 F.2d 414, 415 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907 (1959);
Rotondo v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 243 F.2d 581, 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957);
Old Colony Bondholders v. New York New Haven R.R., 161 F.2d 413, 440 (2d Cir. 1947)
(Frank, J.); United States v. Pleva, 66 F.2d 529, 533 (2d Cir. 1933); Cherensky v. George
Washington-East Motor Lodge, 317 F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Armentrout v.
Virginia Ry., 72 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (S.D. W.Va. 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 166 F.2d 400
(4th Cir. 1948).
81 See cases cited in note 80 supra. In United States v. Taylor, 507 F.2d 166, 168 (5th
Cir. 1975), for example, the court said: "We hold that a jury has not reached a valid verdict
until deliberations are over, the result is announced in open court, and no dissent by a juror
is registered."
82 The interplay of these factors can be illustrated easily from, in large part, the situa-
tion which confronted the Second Circuit in Grace Lines, Inc. v. Motley, 439 F.2d 1028 (2d
Cir. 1971).
Suppose a criminal jury sends a note to a trial judge that it has reached a verdict. The
court calls the jury into the courtroom, asks the foreman what the verdict is, and the fore-
man announces a verdict of guilty. As the judge is polling the jury, one juror says he does
not agree with the verdict, that he just went along out of pressure, that he was coerced, and
that to join the verdict he would be surrendering an honest conviction. What happens to the
verdict? The nature of the grounds involves a juror's mental operations, which are low on
the sliding scale of what grounds are likely to result in impeachment, but because they were
revealed before the verdict became final, and not as product of postverdict importuning by a
defeated party, they would justify rejecting the verdict. In this way, the timing of the revela-
tion can determine the validity of a verdict.
83 See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 48, at § 2350.
84 66 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1933).
88 Id. at 532.
88 Id.
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the jury had been polled, the juror informed the judge that he had
voted for conviction because he was too ill to continue with his
dissenting opinion.8 7 In reversing the conviction, the Second Cir-
cuit found that the juror's "mind was simply overpowered by his
concern for his own well-being and [he] was never persuaded on
the merits to come into agreement. It was therefore, in law, no ver-
dict at all."' 8 In ordering a new trial in one case, the Fifth Circuit
held that postdischarge affidavits from a juror were admissible, not
to impeach the verdict, but to show the true verdict or that no
verdict was ever reached." In another, more recent case, the same
court held that although affidavits are inadmissible to impeach a
verdict after it has been delivered, they are admissible to show
that the verdict delivered was not that which was actually agreed
upon.90 Thus, a court can circumvent the nonimpeachment rules
by inquiring whether a "final verdict" is under attack.
The rules governing impeachment of jury verdicts arose exclu-
sively in the context of complete, unitary, nonpartial verdicts.,1
Such verdicts resolve at once all issues of guilt or innocence, civil
liability, and damages. Partial verdicts, by contrast, deal with only
a portion of the issues submitted to the jury. The possible differ-
ences between complete and partial verdicts necessitate some in-
87 Id.
88 Id. at 533.
11 Fox v. United States, 417 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1969). The jury foreman in Fox an-
nounced in open court a verdict for the government. A jury poll was then undertaken, with
each juror's name being called in rapid succession. Id. at 88. One juror simply looked down
at the floor, without responding audibly. The court clerk finished polling the remaining ju-
rors, who all assented to the verdict. Id. The judge then discharged the jury, whereupon the
silent juror, in response to questioning by the appellant's counsel, stated that he had not
voted unanimously with the other jurors. Id. Affidavits were then obtained stating that the
jurors were of the opinion that a majority was sufficient to reach a verdict, and that the
verdict, as returned, was not in fact unanimous. Id. Upon a motion for a new trial, the
district court rejected the affidavits, stating that to consider them would violate the rule
barring juror impeachment of verdicts. Moreover, the district court concluded, the juror's
silence in open court was an acquiescence to the verdict which had been reported. Id. at 88-
89. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, stating that the affidavit of a juror is admissible to show the
true verdict, or that no verdict was reached. The appellate court also observed that the
juror's silence was ambiguous, and could not be construed as an assent to the verdict. Id. at
88-89.
10 University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 547 n.43 (5th
Cir. 1974). See Young v. United States, 163 F.2d 187 (10th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
859 (1948); Routnier v. Detroit, 338 Mich. 449, 61 N.W.2d 593 (1953); People v. Leonti, 262
N.Y. 256, 186 N.E. 693 (1933) (evidence purporting to show racial prejudice; not for im-
peachment, but rather to establish that vote was nullity).
91 See generally FED. R. Evm. 606(b).
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quiry into the nature and characteristics of partial verdicts before
deciding what impeachment rules control partial verdicts.
III. PARTIAL VERDICTS
A partial verdict is generally understood as a decision by a
jury, before its deliberations are fully completed, on less than all
the issues presented to it.92 After rendering such a partial decision,
a jury resumes its deliberations on the remaining issues.9 3 In a
criminal case, the issues can be broken down as to different
defendants and different counts of the indictment. In a civil case,
the issues can be divided as to different parties, causes of action,
liability, damages, and particular issues sought by special
verdicts.94
The origins of the partial verdict are lost behind the mists of
time. It is unclear precisely how or when a partial verdict was first
used. Of course verdicts are as old as juries, which themselves date
back a thousand years. But verdicts have been understood tradi-
tionally as complete verdicts, a decision by the jury on all the is-
sues presented. There is no long history of partial verdicts.9 5
Civil Cases
Civil cases do not give rise to the type of partial verdict en-
countered in Hockridge. Of course rule 49(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure empowers a judge to ask a jury to return only a
special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each
issue of fact.98 Furthermore, rule 49(b) permits the court to ask a
jury to return a general verdict accompanied by answers to inter-
rogatories.9 7 And, if one or more answers are inconsistent with each
92 See 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 513, at 368 (1969).
93 See, e.g., United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26, 31-32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
832 (1969).
See notes 96-99 and accompanying text infra.
See note 133 and accompanying text infra.
FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a). The special verdict allows the court to require the jury to
return a finding upon specified issues of fact; the court then applies the appropriate law to
the jury's finding and renders a judgment. This procedure eliminates the need for in-
structing the jury upon complicated legal principles and applications. See 5A J. MOORE,
supra note 17, i 49.02, at 2205-06.
97 FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b). The use of a general verdict accompanied by answers to inter-
rogatories is particularly appropriate in complicated cases, since it requires the jury to focus
on the specific aspects raised in the interrogatories; the responses by the jury enable the
court to ascertain that the jury correctly applied the law to the facts. The court may then
[Vol. 54:663
PARTIAL VERDICTS
other or with the general verdict, the court may, among other
things, return the jury for further consideration of its answers.98 A
jury is never permitted under rule 49 or any other rule, however, to
return a verdict as to one issue, and then immediately resume de-
liberations on the remaining issues."" Even in a bifurcated trial,
separate trials are actually held on the issues of liability and dam-
ages, with separate verdicts rendered on each issue.100 Moreover,
only if there is a finding of liability in the first trial will a second
trial-necessitating more deliberations and a second verdict-be
held on the issue of damages. "
The separateness of the trials and verdicts on each issue bears
significantly on impeachment of the verdicts. For example, suppose
a judge in a civil case ordered separate trials as to liability and
damages, and after the liability phase, a plaintiff's verdict was re-
turned by the jury. Then, after evidence had been heard as to
damages, what would happen if, during deliberations on the dam-
ages issues, one of the jurors repudiated his verdict on liability? It
would seem that since the interest in verdict finality is so heavily
implicated,10 2 that evidence on the liability phase should have no
bearing on the first-phase verdict, and that evidence in the second
enter judgment should it find that the general verdict is consistent with the findings of the
jury. If the answers are consistent, but one or more among them is inconsistent with the
general verdict, a judgment may still be entered by the court in accordance with the re-
sponses to the interrogatories, or the jury may be returned for further consideration of its
answers and verdict, or a new trial may be ordered. If the answers are inconsistent, however,
and one or more of them conflicts with the general verdict, the court may not enter judg-
ment, but must either send the jury back for further deliberations or order a new trial. See
5A J. MooRE, supra note 17, I1 49.04, at 2221-29.
S8 See note 97 supra.
When separate trials are ordered, and the jury has rendered a verdict on the first
issue, additional evidence is necessary before the jury can return a verdict on the second
issue. See generally 5 J. MooRE, supra note 17, 1 42.03, at 42-33 to 45.
100 Bifurcated trials are authorized as to any claim or issue by FEnD. R. Civ. P. 42 which
provides in part:
(b) Separate Trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to to avoid
prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and econohy,
may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party
claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counter-
claims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial
by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by
a statute of the United States.
101 See, e.g., Hosie v. Chicago & North Western Ry., 282 F.2d 639, 642-43 (7th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F.
Supp. 577, 586 (N.D. IlM. 1960). See generally Note, Separate Trials on Liability and Dam-
ages in "Routine Cases": A Legal Analysis, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1059 (1962).
' See notes 191-95 and accompanying text infra.
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trial should not be permitted to influence the outcome of the
first. 10 3 Given this precise situation, however, a court came to a
contrary conclusion in Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co.10 4
In Vizzini, a jury verdict for the plaintiff on liability was re-
turned and recorded. After hearing the evidence on damages and
retiring to deliberate on that issue, a spontaneous note from the
jury indicated that the verdict on liability had, in truth, not been
unanimous but the result of compromise. 0 5 After the court or-
dered a trial on damages before a different jury, the defendant
moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of
liability. 06 The court denied the motion, holding, inter alia, that
under rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence the juror was
incompetent to impeach his own verdict.107 In stray and overbroad
dicta, the Vizzini court rejected the arguments that the
nonimpeachment rule is inapplicable before jury discharge or
where the jury acts spontaneously. 08 On appeal, the Third Circuit
vacated and remanded, ruling that the issues of liability and dam-
ages were so intertwined as to require a new trial nonetheless.0 9
The court of appeals specifically declined to determine whether
rule 606(b) was applicable under the circumstances." 0 If, as held in
Vizzini, the issues in a bifurcated trial can be so intertwined, then
of course they can be in an unbifurcated trial as well.
103 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342-43
n.24 (1977); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MIcH. J. oF L. REFORM 397, 468 (1979).
104 72 F.R.D. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1976), vacated and remanded, 569 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1977).
105 72 F.R.D. at 134.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 135.
108 Id. at 136. The district court stated: "The fact that no judgment was entered and
that the same jury continued to deliberate on another aspect of the case should not impair
the validity and finality of the jury's verdict on liability." Id. This dicta was relied on by the
government in Hockridge, see 573 F.2d at 758, but the Second Circuit found Vizzini to be
an "inconclusive" precedent, since there were factual distinctions in the two cases, and the
Third Circuit in Vizzini explicitly reserved decision on the precise issue. Id.
10 569 F.2d 754, 761-62 (3d Cir. 1977). Taking account of the Third Circuit's reasoning
in Vizzini, the Second Circuit in Hockridge said: "We note that the level of symbiosis be-
tween liability and damages that existed in Vizzini ordinarily would not pertain to partial
verdicts on separate counts of an indictment." 573 F.2d at 758 n.15. But the Second Cir-
cuit's observation loses its force where, as in Hockridge, there is an interdependence be-
tween counts, and particularly so, where that interdependence is created by the trial court's
charge to the jury. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
110 569 F.2d at 762 n.2.
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Criminal Cases
Criminal cases obviously do involve partial verdicts of the
Hockridge-type. To be sure, there are bifurcated criminal trials
too, where the first phase focuses on guilt or innocence, and the
second on punishment.111 But from a partial verdict perspective,
such cases are no different from bifurcated civil trials - except
perhaps for the higher degree of solicitude for the rights of a crimi-
nal defendant. The far more interesting cases are those, like
Hockridge, where partial verdicts are taken after one trial. How
partial verdicts in their current form became an accepted part of
our law is a fascinating story, one that underscores the need to be
wary of unexplained extensions of legal principles as well as the
need to reexamine conventional wisdom.
Rule 31(b)
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize partial
verdicts as to several defendants but are silent with respect to par-
tial verdicts as to different counts in an indictment. Rule 31(b) of
the rules does permit "the jury at any time during its deliberations
[to] return a verdict or verdicts with respect to a defendant or de-
fendants." It contains nothing that specifically permits partial ver-
dicts on different counts as were taken in Hockridge.112 Nor does
the rule even so much as refer to partial verdicts on separate
counts.
Despite the relatively unambiguous wording of rule 31(b),
some courts, including the Second Circuit in Hockridge, have cited
the rule as authority for partial verdicts on separate counts."' In
discussing rule 31(b), Professor Wright states that the jury may
render "one or more verdicts on those counts or defendants on
which it is agreed" and then "resume its deliberations about the
remaining charges. 11 4 He then states, "In permitting the practice
"' See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 186-87 (1971) (bifurcated trial in
capital case). In Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 567-68 (1967), however, the Supreme Court
pointed out that, "[t]wo-part jury trials are rare in our jurisprudence; they have never been
compelled by this Court as a matter of constitutional law, or even as a matter of federal
procedure."
... FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(b); see 573 F.2d at 756 n.12.
", See United States v. Hockridge, 573 F.2d 752, 756-57 & n.12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 821 (1978). See also United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26, 31-32 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 832 (1969).
114 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 513, at 368 (1969).
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here described, rule 31(b) is in accord with the prior law."" 5 This
extension of rule 31(b) to partial verdicts on separate counts can-
not be based on the language of the rule itself. Indeed, Professor
Moore's commentary on rule 31(b) is more careful and more faith-
ful to the rule's actual text. Moore, unlike Wright, confines his dis-
cussion only to multidefendant cases and omits entirely any dis-
cussion of multicount cases.116 Thus, given the text of rule 31(b),
Wright's extension, if it has any support at all, must be grounded
in the "prior law" to which he refers.
"Prior Law"
The "prior law" referred to by Wright is at best unclear. Of
the five cases he cites, the three which were decided prior to""' the
effective date of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 18 consist
of two Second Circuit decisions written by Learned Hand in the
early 1930's'19 and a 1941 decision by the Seventh Circuit. 20
Above all others, Learned Hand must bear responsibility for
extending partial verdicts from multiple defendants to multiple
counts. Judge Hand's innovation was either inadvertent, careless,
or intentionally surreptitious, but in any event, it is clearly ex-
posed by examining his decisions in United States v. Cotter,2 ' de-
cided in 1932, and in United States v. Frankel,22 decided a year
later.
In Cotter, one of the cases cited as "prior law" by Professor
Wright, a jury in a criminal case reported that it had reached
agreement as to all but one defendant.1 2 The jury found the cor-
porate defendant guilty of all counts, two individuals guilty of one
116 Id. at 369.
11 See 8A J. MOORE, supra note 17, 31.02[2].
11 Two of the five cases cited by Professor Wright were decided after the effective date
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, therefore, as a simple matter of timing, offer no
support for his comments. The two post-1946 cases cited by Professor Wright are United
States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated and remanded, 390 U.S. 204 (1968),
and Clainos v. United States, 163 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
118 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective on March 21, 1946. 3 C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 921, at 406 (1969).
1,9 United States v. Frankel, 65 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 682 (1933);
United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 666 (1932).
120 United States v. Skidmore, 123 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 800
(1942).
121 60 F.2d 689 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 666 (1932).
121 65 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 682 (1933).
11 60 F.2d at 690.
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count, and one individual not guilty. 24 Before recording the ver-
dict, the trial court learned, on inquiry, that the jury had thought
only one count was enough and had not even considered the other
counts with respect to the individuals. 25 The trial judge sent the
jury back to consider the other counts. Later the jury found the
corporation guilty as before, the two individuals guilty of an addi-
tional count, and with respect to the third were still in disagree-
ment. 26 They were sent out a third time and were finally dis-
charged. 127 It is unclear whether the verdict was recorded before or
after the jury was sent out the third time.
On appeal the Second Circuit rejected one defendant's argu-
ment that no verdict should have been recorded until the jury had
disposed of the whole case.1"8 No argument was made that the jury
should have been allowed to reconsider its initial finding since it
had never been recorded. 2 9 In an opinion that did not expressly
deal with partial verdicts as to multiple counts, Judge Hand ap-
proved partial verdicts as to multiple defendants, noting that the
"only case" found by the court accepted the practice.13 0 But that
case - People v. Cohen,1 31 decided by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in 1918 - involved a partial verdict as to multiple defen-
dants, not multiple counts.132 If Learned Hand's research can be
trusted, there was no precedent prior to 1932 to support a partial
verdict as to separate counts.133
124 Id.
126 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 690-91.
129 It therefore makes no difference that Hand said, "although it is not absolutely clear,
we may assume that [the jury was] given to understand that their deliberation was over as
to the twenty-fifth [count]." 60 F.2d at 690.
,30 60 F.2d at 690-91; see note 131 infra.
131 223 N.Y. 406, 119 N.E. 886 (1918).
s2 223 N.Y. 406, 431, 119 N.E. 886, 893-94 (1918). In Cohen, the defendant was tried
with three other defendants, and was convicted by the jury of first degree murder. After the
jury returned a verdict of guilty as to Cohen and not guilty as to two co-defendants, the
judge charged the jury on different degrees of homicide with respect to the fourth defen-
dant. Id. at 431, 119 N.E. at 893-94. The objection on appeal was directed to the taking of a
partial verdict as to different defendants, not different counts. Id. at 431-32, 119 N.E. at
894.
1.. The Second Circuit in Hockridge cited McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322,
329, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (1899), as precedent for the acceptance of a partial verdict as to sepa-
rate counts, 573 F.2d at 757 n.12, but that case has unique facts that do not support the
general taking of partial verdicts as to separate counts. After the trial judge in McDonald
charged the jury, the jury returned a guilty verdict on four counts. The clerk was asking the
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By the time the Second Circuit decided Frankel13 4 a year
later, Judge Hand had transformed Cotter's rationale completely.
In Frankel, the court of appeals permitted a judge to record a par-
tial verdict on one count and send the jury back to redeliberate on
the other counts.13 5 Judge Hand indulged in no extensive analysis,
saying simply, "We have recently upheld this practice," citing Cot-
ter."6 But neither Cotter, nor its rationale, nor the sole case it re-
lied on, upheld the practice of taking partial verdicts as to multiple
counts. Therein lies the story of Learned Hand's innovative tech-
nique regarding partial verdicts. By means of a maddeningly terse
nod to a recent but inapposite precedent written by himself, Judge
Hand became midwife to a new doctrine which greatly expanded
the scope of partial verdicts.
Building on this sleight of Hand, subsequent courts and com-
mentators1 37 have seized on its taken-for-granted extension, assum-
ing it represented the settled and considered state of the law,
rather than the startling innovation that it was. For example, such
was the stature of Learned Hand that in 1941, the Seventh Circuit
in United States v. Skidmore 8 cited Cotter and Frankel as au-
thoritative precedent for rejecting the contention that a defendant
was put in double jeopardy by allowing a jury to return a verdict as
to one indictment, and then after redeliberating, to find him guilty
on a second indictment, where both indictments were tried to-
gether.13 9 Cotter, Frankel, and Skidmore comprise all of the "prior
law" that Wright contends "is in accord" with the practice of tak-
ing partial verdicts as to multiple counts. 40 Yet Cotter cannot
fairly be read that way, Frankel is based on the false premise of
jury for their verdict on an additional count, "when the judge arose and said that he had
forgotten to charge upon that, and proceeded to do so, and they retired again, and after-
wards came into court, and rendered a verdict of guilty on that part of the indictment." 173
Mass. at 329, 53 N.E. at 875. Although the appellate court found "nothing prejudicial or
unconstitutional in this," id., it is clear that the trial court was simply curing an oversight,
that the jury had not deliberated initially as to the final count, and that the initial verdict
was not partial but complete as to all counts then submitted to the jury.
.3- 65 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 682 (1933).
:3" Id. at 288-89.
3' Id. at 288; see 60 F.2d 689 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 666 (1932).
,37 See, e.g., 4 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2242
(1951).
,38 123 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1941).
39 Id. at 611. In rejecting the defendant's contention, the court simply stated that it
had "no merit" and cited the Cotter and Frankel opinions as authority for its position. Id.
140 See text accompanying note 115 supra.
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Cotter, and Skidmore depends on the imagined synergy of Cotter
and Frankel. In none of these cases is there any genuine discus-
sion, consideration, or evaluation of the practice of taking partial
verdicts on multiple counts. Perhaps aware of the doubtful author-
ity for taking partial verdicts on multiple counts, the draftsmen of
rule 31(b) carefully provided for partial verdicts as to multiple de-
fendants only.141
Current Practice
Regardless of the dubious genesis of partial verdicts on multi-
ple counts, the practice does exist today. Several cases, relying on
the generally accepted though doubtful interpretation of the
Learned Hand cases, have approved the practice. 142 New standard
form jury charges include an instruction for partial verdicts on
multiple counts as well as multiple defendants. 143 Under prevailing
practice, a court is permitted to ask a jury, after it has deliberated
for a reasonable length of time or after it has reported a dead-
lock,14 4 if it has reached agreement as to any count or defendant. 14 5
If such agreement has been reached, the jury may then report it,
and the court may then send the jury back for further delibera-
tions on remaining counts or defendants.1 4 6 Even if well-en-
trenched, however, the practice of taking partial verdicts still
needs to be evaluated since it has escaped intensive scrutiny in the
past.
11 According to the Advisory Committee, rule 31(b), as so limited, "is a restatement of
existing law." S. Doc. No. 175, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1946). By avoiding the whole subject
of partial verdicts on multiple counts, the draftsmen were accurately reflecting the state of
the existing law. The framers' comment on "existing law" is, on analysis, more persuasive as
a contemporary construction than Wright's reference to "prior law."
142 See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 456 F.2d 1037, 1039 (5th Cir. 1972); United States
v. DeLaughter, 453 F.2d 908, 910 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); United States
v. Powell, 413 F.2d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 887 (1969); United States v.
Barash, 412 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832 (1969).
143 See, e.g., 1 E. DEvrrT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS §
18.16, at 611 (1977).
144 A court is not required to ask a jury that reports itself deadlocked whether there is
agreement on any count of a multicount indictment. United States v. Medansky, 486 F.2d
807, 810 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
14M See id. at 810 n.3; United States v. DeLaughter, 453 F.2d 908, 910 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1966), va-
cated and remanded, 390 U.S. 204 (1968); Clainos v. United States, 163 F.2d 593, 596-97
(D.C. Cir. 1947).
" See United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26, 31-32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 382
(1969).
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Advantages and Disadvantages
Partial verdicts do have advantages. In any given case a jury
may agree as to certain issues but be hopelessly deadlocked as to
others. In such a situation, the taking of a partial verdict permits a
resolution of those issues susceptible to resolution, and if there are
no further deliberations, really amounts to a complete verdict as to
those issues. Beyond that situation the perceived advantages of
partial verdicts depend to some extent on one's perception of the
nature and function of partial verdicts.
Viewing partial verdicts solely as a "hedge" device-an admin-
istrative convenience to save time, effort, and money-leads fairly
easily to perceiving finality as the predominant interest served by
such verdicts. In Hockridge, the government argued at every stage,
and the court of appeals agreed, that a recorded partial verdict
should be final for all purposes.1 47 The rationale for this position is
that if partial verdicts were not final, a juror "would be free to
upset a verdict, be it for conviction or acquittal, as many times as
he desired as long as the jury's deliberation continued. . . . Trial
courts would quite clearly be inhibited from taking any such 'non-
final' verdict. '148
Neither the government nor the Second Circuit, however, ex-
plained why partial verdicts must be final for all purposes. To ar-
gue as they did is to ignore other possible advantages of partial
verdicts, as well as to presume, on the basis of nothing more em-
pirical than mere assertion, how trial courts would react. It is just
as plausible that trial courts will be equally willing to take partial
verdicts that are final except in the event of a change resulting
from further deliberations. Such a partial verdict still provides a
significant hedge against unforeseeable events.
"Of course, finality is not sought for its own sake," said the
Second Circuit in Hockridge.149 The traditional reasons for taking
partial verdicts do not require their absolute finality. As the court
of appeals in Hockridge noted, "The reason for taking a partial
verdict is apparent in cases where there has been a long trial and
there exists the prospect of long deliberations. By taking a partial
verdict, the court is able to hedge against the possibility of juror
147 573 F.2d at 759.
' 4 Brief for United States at 28-30, United States v. Hockridge, 573 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.
1978).
1' 573 F.2d at 759.
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illness or death or prejudice by publicity."150 Indeed, the district
court itself had stated: "The purpose of taking a partial verdict is
to avoid a costly and time-consuming retrial in the event that one
of the jurors becomes incapacitated. '151 All of that may well be
true, but it does not necessarily mean that a partial verdict must
be final for all purposes as soon as it is rendered.
If partial verdicts are held final for all purposes, then at least
some of the perceived advantages of partial verdicts will be pur-
chased at a price. Finality may prematurely freeze a jury into a
partial verdict that the subsequent course of deliberations reveals
to be unwise. Thus a partial verdict should be likened only to an
early estimate of guilt or innocence, an estimate that is subject to
revision in light of further deliberation. 152 Finality is therefore an
unrealistic way to account for a jury's decisionmaking process in a
partial verdict situation.153
Absolute finality of partial verdicts violates common sense and
experience with provisional hypotheses, particularly in deliberative
decisionmaking groups. Such hypotheses often undergo change as
more investigation, more light, and more discussion take place.1 "
For example, judges often have formed initial positions following
oral argument, only to change their positions after more reflection
or after reading draft opinions for the majority and the dissent.1 55
250 Id.
'" United States v. Hockridge, No. 77-1243 (S.D.N.Y. April 13, 1977).
15' See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in The Legal Process, 84
H~Av. L. REv. 1329, 1350 (1971). Professor Tribe describes the deliberative process of the
"rational factfinder" as follows:
In deciding a disputed proposition, a rational factfinder probably begins with
some initial, a priori estimate of the likelihood of the proposition's truth, then
updates his prior estimates in light of discoverable evidence bearing on that pro-
position, and arrives finally at a modified assessment of the proposition's likely
truth in light of whatever evidence he has considered. When many items of evi-
dence are involved, each has the effect of adjusting, in greater or lesser degree, the
factfinder's evaluation of the probability that the proposition before him is true.
Id.
,"5 Permitting the jury to update its "prior estimates" does not violate the policy of not
intruding on a jury's wide latitude in reaching its decision, and the judicial system's know-
ing wink at irregularities. See Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920)
("The jury has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts."); 0.
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPS 237-38 (1920); Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action,
44 Am. L. REv. 12, 18 (1910). It is, rather, a far more basic effort to permit and encourage
proper decisionmaking.
I" See generally Slovic, Fischloff & Lichtenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory, 28 ANN.
REV. PSYCH. 1 (1977).
,11 As one member of the Supreme Court recently explained:
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The tentative decision made by appellate judges in conference fol-
lowing oral argument resembles a partial verdict, and that decision
is subject to change prior to publication of the formal written
decision.
The same reality applies to jury verdicts. Certainly votes
taken in the jury room prior to being returned in court are prelimi-
nary.156 One court has noted with insight that this "applies partic-
ularly where more than one count has been submitted to the jury,
for continuing deliberations may shake views expressed on counts
previously considered. 15
7
A New Hybrid Approach
The solution to this riddle of finality lies in a new, more flex-
ible, hybrid approach. A partial verdict should operate as a final
verdict if one of certain potential happenstances - juror illness or
death or prejudice by publicity or similar possibilities - actually
takes place, while at the same time should be nonfinal if further
deliberations bring about a change of mind on the part of the jury.
Such an approach is fully consistent with the advantages inherent
in partial verdicts since it provides the "hedge" thought necessary.
Yet it avoids exalting finality and interfering with the decision-
making process of the jury. The suggested approach recognizes the
Often some of those who voted with him at the conference will say that they want
to reserve final judgment pending circulation of the dissent. It is a common expe-
rience that drafts of dissenting opinions change votes, even enough votes to be-
come the majority. Before everyone has finally made up his mind, a constant in-
terchange goes on while we work out the final form of the Court opinion.
Stewart, Inside the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1979, § a, at 17, cols. 2-4. Cf. Adler,
The Justices and the Journalists, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1979, § 7, at 26 ("Now it must be
obvious, on a moment's reflection, that it is desirable - even essential to the judicial pro-
cess - that the Justices be able sometimes to persuade one another, to change their
minds."). See also Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l, 608 F.2d 43, 48
(2d Cir. 1979) ("on a renewed motion for summary judgment before a second judge, the
district court must balance the need for finality against the forcefulness of any new evidence
and the demands of justice. . . .[F]urther reflection may allow a better informed ruling in
accordance with the conscience of the court").
,16 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 507 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1975), and cases cited
therein.
"I Id. at 168. It is only fair to point out, however, that the court in Taylor added that
while "U]urors are not bound by votes in the jury room and remain free to register dissent
even after the verdict is announced," they should do so "before the verdict is recorded." Id.
Taylor nonetheless recognized the underlying principle of tentative decisions in the deci-
sionmaking process, and quite clearly stands for the proposition that "a jury has not
reached a valid verdict until deliberations are over." Id. Of course deliberations are not
"over" when a jury continues to deliberate.
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significant qualitative difference between fortuitous possibilities,
such as juror incapacity or impermissible prejudice on the one
hand, and contemplated and routine occurrences, such as changes
of mind in light of further deliberation, on the other.
Perhaps aware of the reality of the decisionmaking process,
courts omit to instruct jurors that any partial verdict, once ren-
dered, is absolutely final. 15 Typically, the instructions suggest that
partial verdicts might help the jury to proceed "systematically. ' 159
But where there is nothing in these instructions to indicate that a
recorded partial verdict is unchangeable and immutable forever, a
jury might well think a partial verdict was entirely nonfinal. To
hold a partial verdict absolutely final in such circumstances might
involve some deception of the jury. Nevertheless, a partial verdict
reached under such circumstances, even if tentative, would still be
valuable to orderly and systematic decisionmaking.
Partial verdicts must be considered in the nature of tentative,
working hypotheses subject to change prior to the jury's discharge.
Therefore, if they are allowed at all they must be regarded only as
assumptions adopted to permit or facilitate further deliberations,
assumptions that are not immutable until the jury is discharged.
The juror, like the journalist and judge, "must formulate his views
and, at every step, question his conclusions, tentative or other-
wise."1 0 This approach is the only approach fully consistent with
scientific method, whose hallmark is a readiness to abandon theory
when the facts so demand. 161 Changes in our early hypotheses indi-
cate that we are progressively realizing the ideal, since they arise
from corrections in previous observations or reasoning, and such
,' In Clainos v. United States, 163 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1947), the trial judge, in a mild
and reasonable tone, described the procedure for rendering a partial verdict to the jury as
follows:
I suggest - and this is only a suggestion - that perhaps you can make or-
derly progress and most expeditious progress if you proceed systematically and
take the various counts of the indictment, one by one, and reach a conclusion on
each count, if you can, separately. If you should come to a situation where you can
agree on a verdict on some of the counts, but not on the others, come in and
return a verdict on those counts that you can agree on and then we will determine
whether to send you back and ask you to deliberate on other counts.
Id. at 596.
159 Id.
110 See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 34 REC. OF N.Y.C.B.A. 157, 186
(1979) (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 984 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds,
441 U.S. 153 (1979)).
161 See, e.g., M. COHEN & E. NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD
394 (1934).
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correction means that we are in possession of more reliable facts.
In science, law, or any intellectually honest discipline, we select
that hypothesis most probable on the factual evidence; it is the
task of further inquiry to find other factual evidence that will in-
crease or decrease the probability of such a theory. Applying any
hypothesis involves some risk, for it may not in fact be applicable.
Viewing partial verdicts as tentative, working hypotheses, however,
is a self-corrective process that makes possible the noting and cor-
rection of errors by continued application of itself prior to jury
discharge.
Although it may well be too late to turn back the clock on the
basic question of the propriety of partial verdicts on multiple
counts, it is not too late to query whether a jury instructed to con-
tinue deliberating as to remaining counts can reconsider findings of
guilt that it has reported earlier. 162
IV. WEAVING THE STRANDS TOGETHER
Determining the proper circumstances for impeachment of
partial verdicts requires weaving the policies behind the rules for
impeachment of complete verdicts together with the policies em-
bodied in partial verdicts. Central to any such determination is the
meaning and effect of rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which governs the admissibility of a juror's statements to impeach
a verdict or indictment. Although rule 606(b) permits a juror to
impeach his verdict where "extraneous prejudicial information" is
brought to his attention, or where he is improperly subjected to
"outside influence," the rule prohibits a juror from "testify[ing] as
to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any
other juror's mind or emotions" which may have influenced him to
"assent to or dissent from the verdict."36
The court of appeals noted in Hockridge that, "neither the
cases nor the treatises definitively answer the question whether
rule 606(b) bars the impeachment of a partial verdict by the volun-
tary and spontaneous testimony of a juror prior to the jury's dis-
charge.""" The determination called for by this "difficult and
182 See 1 E. DEvIrr & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 143, at 612.
13 FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
14 573 F.2d at 758. The court continued: "Even the leading treatises ignore the rela-
tionship between Rule 606(b) and partial verdicts after which a jury continues its delibera-
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novel" problem must, then, proceed from basic principles and
policies.
Reasoning from basic principles and policies, the Second Cir-
cuit in Hockridge concluded that rule 606(b) did bar consideration
of spontaneous and voluntary statements by jurors regarding the
regularity of a partial verdict after the partial verdict was recorded
but before the jury was discharged. 165 The court found no basis for
distinguishing the application of rule 606(b) to complete verdicts
on the one hand and to partial verdicts followed by continuing de-
liberations on the other." 8 The Hockridge court cast the issue in
terms of three relevant policy interests - freedom of deliberation,
verdict finality, and freedom from postverdict annoyance, embar-
rassment, or harrassment - and held that the appellants' position
was defective because "it mischaracterized the impeachment of
partial verdicts as not implicating the jury's freedom of delibera-
tion" and because it overlooked verdict finality.1 67
Given the difficult nature of the problem, it is appropriate to
reexamine the Second Circuit's reasoning in Hockridge to see if it
is, after all, the correct approach. Prior to Hockridge there was no
precedent directly on point, and it is still too early to tell what
kind of reception Hockridge will receive. 68
On close analysis, the decision in Hockridge is fundamentally
deficient in several respects. In the first place, the court incorrectly
evaluated two of the three factors actually discussed. It overlooked
its own intrusion into the freedom of jury deliberations, while at
the same time misinterpreting rule 606(b), thus exalting finality
over other interests. The second fundamental flaw in the Second
Circuit's analysis is that it totally ignored countervailing considera-
tions justifying impeachment of a partial verdict, thereby skewing
the inquiry in favor of nonimpeachment.
Freedom of Jury Deliberations
The first consideration relied on by the court of appeals in
Hockridge involves freedom of jury deliberations. The court said
that the inquiry requested by the appellants in Hockridge "would
tions." Id. (footnote omitted).
165 Id. at 759.
16I Id.
167 Id.; see notes 169-217 and accompanying text infra.
168 See notes 1-8 and accompanying text supra.
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have necessitated scrutiny of the deliberations of the jury includ-
ing the mental processes of the jurors." ' Such a result would, ac-
cording to the Second Circuit, be "inconsistent with the strictures
of rule 606(b)," which embodies a "strong congressional purpose of
protecting the jury deliberation process. ' 17 0 Recognizing that rule
606(b) does not on its face apply to partial verdicts, the court rea-
soned that "the policy against intrusion into internal deliberations
remains the same. 17 1 The court, moreover, expressly assumed that
in enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress had in mind
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including rule 31(b).' 72
As a result, the court in Hockridge concluded that, "while the free-
dom of jury deliberations is less threatened by impeachment of
partial verdicts than by impeachment of verdicts generally, it is,
nevertheless, clearly impinged.' 173
This conclusion is based on a series of demonstrable errors. In
applying rule 606(b) to partial verdicts the court in Hockridge ex-
tended that rule's scope far beyond any justification in its text or
legislative history and in fact clearly violated the congressional in-
tent behind rule 606(b).
Text of Rule 606(b). By its own terms, the evidentiary bar of
rule 606(b) applies only "[u]pon an inquiry into the validity of a
verdict or indictment. ' 174 The language itself implies the existence
of a "verdict" to be inquired into and, as a matter of ordinary in-
terpretation in light of existing law, would seem inapplicable
before jury discharge. 1  By invoking rule 606(b) prior to deciding
19 573 F.2d at 759.
170 Id. FED. R. EVID. 606(b), as originally proposed, stated that "a juror may not testify
concerning the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influenc-
ing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental
processes in connection therewith." Preliminary Draft of Rule 606(b), 46 F.R.D. 161, 289-90
(1969). Substantial changes were introduced by the Advisory Committee, however, which
expanded the exclusionary principle to reach "any matter or statement occurring during the
course of the jury's deliberations." See FED. R. EVID. 606(b). Even with the addition of two
exceptions - for "extraneous prejudicial information" and "outside influence" - the addi-
tion of this new category to the exclusionary principle gave the rule far broader coverage
than the originally proposed version of rule 606(b). Although Congress gave serious consid-
eration to the more narrow proposal, see 120 CONG. REc. 2374-75 (1974), the rule was en-
acted in its broader form. See Mueller, Juror's Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments
in Federal Court Under Rule 606(b), 57 NEB. L. REv. 920, 927-32 (1978).
11 573 F.2d at 759.
1712 Id.; see notes 179-81 and accompanying text infra.
173 573 F.2d at 759.
17 FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
175 See notes 178-79 and accompanying text infra. Professor Wigmore has noted, in
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what constitutes a "final verdict," the court in Hockridge begged
the crucial threshold question. Certainly nothing on the face of
rule 606(b) suggests its applicability to spontaneous and voluntary
statements by jurors regarding a partial verdict before delibera-
tions have been concluded.
Congressional Intent. Even if there is some ambiguity in the
text of rule 606(b), the legislative history behind it shows that
Congress plainly intended it not to apply to inquiries prior to the
end of trial. 76 To be sure, the Second Circuit was obviously correct
in stating that rule 606(b) embodies a "strong congressional pur-
pose of protecting the jury deliberation process, '177 as would any
rule of evidence barring any type of inquiry into jury deliberations.
But the court of appeals totally ignored the congressional intent to
encourage such inquiries during the course of deliberations.
Congress decided to make posttrial inquiries difficult precisely
because such difficulty would impel jurors to make any complaints
before, and not after, the trial ended. This is made clear in the
House-Senate Conference Report of Rule 606(b) which states why
the participants rejected a House proposal to delete the proscrip-
tion against juror testimony about any matter or statement occur-
ring during the course of the jury's deliberations: "The Conferees
believe that jurors should be encouraged to be conscientious in
promptly reporting to the court misconduct that occurs during jury
deliberations. 17 8 Yet in spite of such palpable evidence of specific
contrary congressional intent, the Second Circuit held that the pol-
icy against intrusion into internal jury deliberations embodied in
rule 606(b) applies with equal force to inquiry into partial verdicts
before jury deliberations have ended.
The Second Circuit's additional argument that Congress
passed rule 606(b) mindful of rule 31(b) of the Federal Rules of
reference to the nonimpeachment principle:
The reasons for the foregoing rule, namely, the dangers of uncertainty and of tam-
pering with the jurors to procure testimony, disappear in large part if such investi-
gation as may be desired is made by the judge and takes place before the jurors'
discharge and separation.
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2350, at 691 (McNaughton ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
178 See note 178 infra.
177 Id., citing S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051.
178 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7102. Cf. 120 CONG. REC. 2375 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Wiggins)
(juror complaints should be made prior to the close of trial).
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Criminal Procedure17 is nothing more than a makeweight, and an
extraordinarily weak one at that. Presumably, the court of appeals
was implying that Congress was well aware of the partial-verdict
procedure supposedly authorized by rule 31(b), and that rule
606(b) had to have been enacted with an eye toward partial ver-
dicts. But there is nothing in the legislative history of rule 606(b)
that refers to rule 31(b), and there is nothing in the language of
rule 31(b) that would necessarily call to mind partial verdicts as to
different counts.180 Nonetheless, the court in Hockridge relied on
the legislative history of rule 606(b), though it referred to such leg-
islative history as "perhaps not determinative.' 8 1 More accurate
analysis shows that the legislative history of rule 606(b) is determi-
native of a result opposite to that reached by the court of appeals.
A Speculative Threat. More significantly, the court in
Hockridge never articulated exactly how jury deliberations would
be impinged if a different result had been reached by the court.
Apparently the court's premise was that any scrutiny of jury delib-
erations which includes the mental processes of the jurors consti-
tutes a threat to the freedom of jury deliberations, no matter when
such scrutiny occurs, who conducts it, or what causes it.1 82 As
framed by the Second Circuit, this premise is false and far too
overbroad. Under the Second Circuit's formulation, every instruc-
tion from the judge, every complaint of misconduct, and every con-
tact between jury and judge would be a threat to the freedom of
jury deliberations. Yet these situations have never been perceived
as a sufficient threat to the freedom of jury deliberations to pre-
vent contact between the jury and the court. 83 On the contrary,
the law specifically contemplates and encourages such contacts in
order to maintain the integrity of the factfinding process.184 The
179 573 F.2d at 759. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
180 See notes 112-41 and accompanying text supra. The Hockridge court noted that the
relationship between rule 606(b) and partial verdicts had not been analyzed by the treatise
authors; it also indicated that there was an absence of case law on the matter. 573 F.2d at
758 & n.17.
I81 573 F.2d at 759.
1.2 Id. The Hockridge court's assertion that scrutiny of the mental processes of jurors is
to be avoided may be limited to scrutiny after rendering a partial verdict. The Hockridge
court, however, did not so limit its rationale.
1'3 See generally 6A J. MooRE, supra note 17, 1 59.08[4].
18 Rule 606(b) specifically allows a juror to testify concerning "extraneous prejudicial
information" or "outside influence" impacting upon the jury even after a trial verdict has
been rendered. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). Where there is evidence of intrusion into jury delibera-
tions, the trial judge may conduct an examination to determine the prejudicial effect, if any.
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simple fact is that the Second Circuit's perceived threat to the
freedom of deliberations is speculative, theoretical, and tradition-
ally has been outweighed by other factors - such as justice and
fairness to litigants - which counsel in favor of some control, how-
ever mild, over a jury prior to its discharge. 185
The Real Threat. Paradoxically, the holding of Hockridge it-
self constitutes a far more serious threat to the freedom of jury
deliberations in cases involving partial verdicts. A realistic view of
the deliberative process shows that a partial verdict operates as a
jury's tentative, working hypothesis.18 The provisional conclusion
temporarily suffices as a basis for the jury to go on with its deliber-
ations on other issues. But the working hypothesis should be sub-
ject to revision after further consideration and discussion prior to
the end of the trial, lest the jury be deprived of the freedom to
arrive at its result in the freest and most reasonable fashion. This
is particularly true of situations where the judge's instructions,
designed for ordinary citizens as opposed to legal scholars, 187 create
an interdependence between issues. For example, the fact that the
jury in Hockridge was given a modified Pinkerton88 instruction
that tied the conspiracy charge to the substantive counts, estab-
lishes the reasonable possibility that the jurors thought the partial
verdict on the conspiracy charge should have been changed after
analysis of the evidence relating to the substantive counts."8 What
could be more logical on the part of the jurors and more in the
interest of freedom of jury deliberations? Jurors cannot stop form-
ing tentative hypotheses, but they can cease articulating them
openly.190 If partial verdicts are not susceptible to modification, ju-
rors may become reluctant to report a partial verdict. By invoking
See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954); Morgan v. United States, 399
F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1025 (1969).
185 Accord, Morgan v. United States, 399 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1025 (1969).
18 See notes 152-60 and accompanying text supra.
181 See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484 (1978).
188 See note 13 supra.
The Second Circuit seemed particularly insensitive to the problem of interdepen-
dence posed by Hockridge. See note 109 supra. Compare Pacelli v. United States, 588 F.2d
360 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979) with United States ex rel. Hetenyi v.
Wilkins, 384 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1966).
I" Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 208 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to
possible reactions by journalists to pretrial discovery in libel cases). Merely because the jury
offers its finding in open court does not mean that it should, or in fact can, freeze that issue
out of its further deliberations.
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the policy of freedom of deliberations as a justification for prema-
turely freezing a jury into a partial verdict before it has fully con-
sidered the relationship between the partial verdict and the rest of
verdict, the court in Hockridge has turned the interest in freedom
of jury deliberations inside out.
Verdict Finality
The second interest relied on by the court of appeals in
Hockridge involves "verdict finality." Aware that finality "obvi-
ously would be enhanced" by not allowing impeachment of partial
verdicts, the court added that, "of course, finality is not sought for
its own sake."191 The court went on to say, however, that a partial
verdict should be given final effect since, as Learned Hand had
said in Cotter: "It would only promote irresponsible hesitation to
tell [the jury] that they must reserve their decision altogether until
they got through; the appellants had no right in [the jury's] subse-
quent vacillations." 192 Noting that a partial verdict enables a judge
"to hedge against the possibility of juror illness or death or
prejudice by publicity," 93 the Second Circuit concluded that a "re-
corded partial verdict ought not be disturbed absent a showing of
the type which would permit impeachment of a complete
verdict."19
This conclusion does precisely what it disclaims; it exalts final-
ity for its own sake, at the expense of other competing interests.
Less obviously but no less importantly, it fails to promote the rea-
sons underlying the concept of verdict finality. Moreover, in its
quest for finality at all costs, the Hockridge court not only erred in
equating partial and complete verdicts, but also misapplied its own
test by refusing to use jury discharge as the cutoff point for
finality.195
Finality Enthroned At The Expense of Freedom of Jury De-
liberations. The court's quotation from Learned Hand in support
of verdict finality seriously cuts against the court's other basis for
decision-freedom of jury deliberations. Once past the reverence to
191 573 F.2d at 759.
192 Id. (quoting United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689, 690 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287
U.S. 666 (1932)). Cotter is a frequently-if inappropriately - cited case for the propriety of
partial verdicts as to different counts. See notes 121-41 and accompanying text supra.
193 573 F.2d at 759.
1 Id. at 759-60.
199 See notes 205-13 and accompanying text infra.
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Learned Hand, and alert to the allure of his phrasing,"' we see
that what Judge Hand pejoratively calls "irresponsible hesitation"
and "subsequent vacillation" may just as easily be referred to in a
complimentary tone as "responsible suspension of final judgment"
and "later, intelligent and informed modification of a tentative
working hypothesis after full consideration of all evidence on all
issues." Judge Hand's rather one-sided concern in Cotter to pre-
vent "hesitation" and "vacillations" must be weighed in the bal-
ance against freedom of jury deliberations.197
Freedom of deliberations means a jury should not be prema-
turely pushed to a verdict before it is absolutely ready, absolutely
sure that it thinks such a verdict is correct within the confines of
the applicable burdens of proof.198 Yet the Second Circuit's adop-
tion of the Cotter formulation chills freedom of deliberations. It
embodies an attitude antagonistic to the full, robust, and uninhib-
ited evaluation and reevaluation by a jury before rendering a final
verdict.
A perfect example of this inhibiting effect can be seen where,
as in Hockridge, an interdependence exists between various issues.
The jury in Hockridge was told that it could find the defendants
guilty of the substantive counts if it concluded that the defendants
were guilty of conspiracy to commit certain acts.199 Since the dis-
puted partial verdict of guilt related to the conspiracy count, the
jury may well have proceeded on the incorrect assumption that
there was a conspiracy in order to find the defendants guilty of the
I" See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1061 (1980), where the court, referring to the "cryptic" and "characteristi-
cally striking prose by Judge Hand," said: "In examining this language . . . we perceive
Hand the philosopher. As an operative rule of law, however, the ... phrase does not suf-
fice." Id. at 273-74.
10 Judge Hand's attitude in Cotter should be contrasted with his attitude in Jorgensen
v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947), where the
court of appeals declined to set aside a civil verdict achieved by compromise, but did accept
as evidence the postdischarge affidavits of jurors. In the course of his opinion, Judge Hand
wrote that "judges again and again repeat the consecrated rubric [the nonimpeachment
rule] which has so confused the subject; it offers an easy escape from embarrassing choices."
Id. at 435.
"' Although the trial judge may encourage the jury to strive to reach a verdict, see
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), his statements may necessitate a retrial if their
effect is to coerce the jury into reaching a verdict. See Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S.
445, 446 (1965); United States v. Scott, 547 F.2d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Taylor, 530 F.2d 49, 51 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1181-83
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
Il See note 13 supra.
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substantive counts. There is no way to tell whether or not the jury
used the conspiracy conviction as the basis for the substantive con-
viction.200 The refusal to set aside a partial verdict that has been
repudiated before the end of deliberations thus inhibits the free-
dom of those very deliberations. The interest in verdict finality
then assumes preeminence in derogation of the equally important
interest in the freedom of jury deliberations.
Failure to Further Underlying Interests in Finality. Ironi-
cally, treating partial verdicts as final fails even to promote the
interests thought to be served by finality of verdict.20 1 Although
inroads in the concept of verdict finality generally tend to under-
mine confidence in the integrity of our procedures, 0 2 the opposite
occurs where a partial verdict is repudiated before deliberations
are over. Such confidence is enhanced, however, if the questionable
verdict is not treated as final and is set aside. Indeed, treating such
a partial verdict as final would tend to do the very undermining
the finality rule was designed, at least in part, to prevent.
Since a court in a Hockridge-type case becomes aware of the
problems with the partial verdict before the trial is over, the inter-
est in preventing endless litigation is likewise irrelevant. There is
no subsequent litigation, no collateral attack, no increased volume
of judicial work, no delay in the orderly administration of justice,
and no retrial. Whereas finality normally discourages what might
be a flood of attacks on verdicts, the Hockridge court itself recog-
nized that it was dealing with a case of first impression.20s The lack
of precedent is more likely due to the rarity of the factual occur-
rence than to the lack of defense counsel's ingenuity. In short,
none of the interests underlying verdict finality - except for ad-
ministrative convenience - is served by treating partial verdicts as
final.2
0 4
200 Even if the jury could have ignored the modified Pinkerton instruction and found
the defendants guilty for other reasons, we cannot be certain that this is what actually oc-
curred. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARM-
LESS ERROR 23 (1970).
201 See notes 43-49 and accompanying text supra.
202 Cf. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n.11 (1979) (discussing reasons for
narrowly limiting grounds for collateral attack on final judgments).
202 Any deluge of litigation in this context is airy speculation and "should not be per-
mitted to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise sound constitutional principles."
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (constitutional tort for violation of Fourth Amendment
rights). See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
204 See note 232 infra; 8A J. MOORE, supra note 17, V 31.0811], at 31-69.
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Rejection of Jury Discharge as Finality Cutoff. It is equally
ironical that although it ultimately held that partial and complete
verdicts should be treated exactly alike for impeachment purposes,
the court in Hockridge rejected jury discharge as the point when
finality attaches to a partial verdict.20 5 The Second Circuit thus
misapplied its own test by refusing to use the same test for finality
of both partial and complete verdicts. The authorities are unani-
mous, however, that a complete verdict becomes final only on jury
discharge,208 and sometimes remains nonfinal for a short period af-
ter discharge. 07 The Second Circuit noted this "usual rule,"2 0 ' and
furthermore stated that with respect to partial verdicts, it could
"perceive no reasons of sufficient magnitude to depart from the
normal rules governing impeachment of jury verdicts."210 Yet,
without breaking stride, it departed from those normal rules by
making a partial verdict final the moment it is recorded instead of
when the jury is discharged.210
Relying on nothing more than the force of assertion, and with-
out even attempting to reconcile its conclusion with the usual rule,
the court stated that the recording of a partial verdict marks the
cutoff point for finality.2"" The court cited no case or other author-
ity - and research has disclosed none - for the proposition that a
complete verdict becomes final on recording rather than discharge.
The acid test for the court's theory is the outcome where jurors
repudiate a complete verdict between recording and discharge, but
in that case, repudiation is proper.212 Inasmuch as a recorded com-
202 573 F.2d at 758.
20 See note 80 supra. Cf. Commonwealth v. Patrick, 416 Pa. 437, 206 A.2d 295, 297
(1965) (150 years of precedent prevent a jury from impeaching recorded verdict after sepa-
ration and discharge); Cortez v. State, 415 P.2d 196, 201 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966) (no im-
peachment "after they have been discharged").
207 E.g., Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 764 (1947) (accepting as evidence postdischarge affidavits of jurors); Mattice v. Mary-
land Cas. Co., 5 F.2d 233 (W.D. Wash. 1925) (new trial ordered where, immediately after
discharge and following announcement of verdict and polling, juror stated he dissented). See
also 8 J. WIOMORE, supra note 48 at § 2350 ("and even after an initial discharge, the judge
may reconvene [jury]"). A fortiori, these cases support consideration of jurors' impeaching
statements after the verdict is recorded but before discharge.
208 573 F.2d at 758 & n.16.
209 Id. at 759.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 See notes 80 & 207 and accompanying text supra. In United States v. Pleva, 66 F.2d
529, 533 (2d Cir. 1933), the Second Circuit said, "we leave untouched the question of what
effect may be given to proof offered, after a verdict is recorded, of what transpired during
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plete verdict is not final until jury discharge, Hockridge makes a
recorded partial verdict more final than a recorded complete
verdict.
This assertion by the Second Circuit not only marks a striking
departure from precedent, but also constitutes a non sequitur with
significant consequences for the finality of complete verdicts. In
view of the court's unique approach to the subject, it would have
been better and more candid if the court had launched its holding
as an entirely new doctrine, instead of sailing it under the com-
plete verdict flag.
Yet the familiar standard of jury discharge reflects the benefit
of extensive experience, accommodates the factors relevant to
verdict finality, and provides the relative simplicity and clarity
necessary to the implementation of workable rules for both com-
plete and partial verdicts. It would be better to adopt a clean-cut
rule that all verdicts are nonfinal until jury discharge. Such an ap-
proach would simplify the law of impeachment without seriously
derogating from the values protected by verdict finality. This ap-
proach also accords with the inherently tentative nature of partial
verdicts, which by definition, are incomplete. The decisionmaking
process requires them to be provisional too.
213
Postverdict Annoyance
A third interest identified by the court of appeals in
Hockridge concerns "freedom from postverdict annoyance, embar-
the deliberations of the jury."
213 Of course, a partial verdict can be either favorable or unfavorable, and a litigant will
not mind at all if an unfavorable partial verdict is later changed to a favorable final verdict,
but will be chagrined if events take the opposite course, and a favorable partial verdict
becomes an unfavorable final verdict. Yet such chagrin should be one of the expected and
accepted risks of the adversary process. It should take only slight education for litigants to
learn the limits of their reasonable expectations in this regard, and to grasp the point that
nonfinal partial verdicts are a two-way street. Even in a criminal context, where a nonfinal
partial verdict of not guilty may become a final verdict of guilty, there is no special problem,
and no violation of the double jeopardy clause. By definition, a nonfinal partial verdict of
not guilty in no way constitutes a binding acquittal, thereby failing to activate any claim of
former jeopardy. See, e.g., Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); United States v. Perez, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). See also Downurn v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); Gori v.
United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961). Since there is only one trial, there is no second jeopardy.
Moreover, as a matter of logic and symmetry, the concept of nonfinal partial verdicts neces-
sarily implies the possibility that any nonfinal partial verdict - favorable or unfavorable -
may be altered before jury discharge.
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rassment, or harassment."' This interest reflects the longstanding
policy against encouraging defeated litigants and their lawyers to
approach jurors after a verdict to find out how the verdict was
reached.2 15 In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals in
Hockridge did not rely on this third consideration because the
facts simply did not implicate it.21
It is a simple matter to contemplate situations where the facts
would impinge on the postverdict freedom of jurors. A significantly
different case would be presented, for instance, if the defendants in
Hockridge or their lawyers had approached and solicited state-
ments from jurors either during or after their deliberations. In that
event, a court could rightly hold that such procurement clearly vio-
lates one of the important interests sought to be protected by the
nonimpeachment rule.21"
Countervailing Considerations
The ultimate decision to impeach or not to impeach involves a
balancing, a choice between the interests sought to be protected by
the nonimpeachment rule on the one hand, and injustice to the
litigant on the other.1 " Yet the analysis in Hockridge omitted any
discussion whatsoever of the cluster of considerations that im-
peachment would have served. Instead of basing its decision on an
assessment of the competing societal interests involved, the
Hockridge court's focus was limited exclusively to an evaluation of
the reasons against impeachment.1 9 Certainly those competing in-
terests are of sufficient magnitude, however, to have some bearing
on the decision of whether or not impeachment is appropriate.
Chief Justice Burger has recently reminded us that "the func-
2,1 See United States v. Hockridge, 573 F.2d at 758; Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d
77, 82 (2d Cir. 1968).
115 See, e.g., McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915); United States v. Moten, 582
F.2d 654, 664-67 (2d Cir. 1978); Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1968).
2" Since Hockridge involved a voluntary and spontaneous declaration by a juror prior
to the jury's discharge, there was no need for the court to invoke the interest in freedom
from postverdict interrogation. See 573 F.2d at 759.
2' In some circumstances, of course, posttrial investigation of jurors may well be appro-
priate, albeit under judicial supervision. See United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 664-67
(2d Cir. 1978).
28 See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915)("the court must choose between
redressing the injury of the private litigant and inflicting the public injury which would
result if jurors were permitted to testify as to what happened in the jury room."); United
States v. Moten, 582 F.2d at 665; 6A J. MooRE, supra note 17, 69.08[4], at 59-143 to 144.
219 See generally 573 F.2d at 758-59.
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tion of the legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous deci-
sions. ' '221 Our judicial system has traditionally been concerned
with the integrity of the procedures used to ascertain the truth at a
criminal trial.221 It is essential that the guilt-determining process
be scrupulously free from and above even the appearance of taint
or impropriety. 222 To this end, the Supreme Court has recognized
the importance of adopting procedures that preserve the appear-
ance of fairness and public confidence in the decisionmaking
process.
The situation in Hockridge throws grave suspicion on the ac-
curacy and integrity of the partial verdict. More than one juror
said, before deliberations were over, that they had reasonable
doubt about the guilt of certain defendants, that they had been
"railroaded" into a "miscarriage of justice," and that they had sur-
rendered their honest convictions. 223
Allowing a partial verdict to stand in such circumstances
makes relevant an inquiry into several specific rights of the crimi-
nal defendant, particularly those surrounding a jury trial. If, as is
generally agreed, a jury trial is a basic and hallowed right of a de-
fendant in serious criminal cases, the proud boast of a free society,
embodying a deep national commitment as a defense against arbi-
trary law enforcement,224 then there should be corresponding pro-
tections to assure the propriety of the results of a jury trial. One
such protection lies in the well-recognized requirement that a jury
verdict in a federal criminal case be unanimous.225 But the repudi-
ation of a partial verdict by jurors before discharge makes a verdict
less than unanimous. Related to the unanimity requirement is the
level of proof required for conviction. A criminal defendant is
120 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
221 See generally United States v. United States Coin & Curr., 401 U.S. 715, 717-22
(1971); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653-55 (1971); Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297-98 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719, 729 (1966).
322 People v. De Jesus, 42 N.Y.2d 519, 369 N.E.2d 752, 399 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1977).
231 573 F.2d at 757.
' Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
1 Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1948); Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276 (1930). Not only is unanimity required by case law and tradition, it is also required
by rule 31(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and probably by the sixth amend-
ment. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 414 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). See gener-
ally Orfield, Verdict in Federal Criminal Cases, 15 MERCER L. REV. 378 (1964).
[Vol. 54:663
PARTIAL VERDICTS
cloaked with a presumption of innocence,226 and a verdict of guilt
must be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.227 Guilt cannot
be said to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt when one
or more jurors at the end of deliberation still possesses such a
doubt.
It may be that most if not all of these considerations are pre-
sent in every case presenting a question of impeaching a jury ver-
dict. Nevertheless, they are real and need to be evaluated, lest, as
in Hockridge, they be overlooked entirely."
From this analysis emerge certain principles applicable to de-
termining whether or not a partial verdict in a criminal case should
be set aside following revelations of jury irregularities. As a matter
of methodology, the ultimate decision whether or not to impeach a
partial verdict involves careful evaluation of the three basic inter-
ests traditionally sought to be protected by the nonimpeachment
rule and a balancing of the results of that evaluation against
whatever affirmative reasons exist for allowing impeachment.
In the context of this methodology, four basic conclusions may
be drawn. First, whereas inquiry into a partial verdict prior to jury
discharge may, in some theoretical and speculative sense, impinge
on the abstract freedom of jury deliberations, an absolute bar to
such inquiry would pose a much more clear and present danger to
that same freedom, especially where different jury issues are inter-
dependent. Moreover, Congress designed rule 606(b) to bar post-
trial inquiry and to encourage such inquiry while jury deliberations
were still going on. Second, a partial verdict should not be treated
as final until the jury is discharged; until then it is akin to a tenta-
tive working hypothesis made necessary by the realities of deliber-
ative decisionmaking. Third, a spontaneous and voluntary state-
ment by a juror prior to discharge in no way diminishes the
protection of jurors from posttrial annoyance and harassment. Fi-
nally, affirmative reasons - such as the integrity of the guilt-de-
termining process, the requirements of jury unanimity and proof
22 Although the Supreme Court recently has trimmed the scope of the presumption of
innocence, see Kentucky v. Wharton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979) (per curiam) (jury instruction
regarding presumption not always required as a matter of due process); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (presumption allocates burden of proof in criminal trials but does not
effect rights of pretrial detainee during confinement before trial has started), "[w]ithout
question, the presumption of innocence plays an important role in our criminal justice sys-
tem." Id. at 533.
227 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970); see C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 403, at 66 (1969).
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beyond a reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence -
counsel in favor of impeachment of partial verdicts.
The net result of the called-for balancing is that where a juror
makes a spontaneous and voluntary statement after a partial ver-
dict has been recorded but prior to jury discharge, a court should
consider such statement as if it were made after a complete verdict
had been recorded but before jury discharge. If the statement
would be insufficient to require redeliberation as to a previously
recorded complete verdict, then it should not be sufficient to re-
quire redeliberation as to a previously recorded partial verdict. But
if it would be enough in the complete verdict case, then the defen-
dant in the partial verdict case should not be put at a disadvantage
and made to suffer simply because a partial verdict rather than a
complete verdict was used in his case; the juror's statement should
justify redeliberation as to the previously recorded partial verdict.
V. CONCLUSION
These emergent principles should be capable of straightfor-
ward application, without creating undue difficulty for a trial
judge. In Hockridge, the court of appeals strongly disapproved of
Judge Bonsal's discussion with the two jurors, "which to some ex-
tent implied that they might, along with the other jurors, recon-
sider the recorded verdict." 2218 The Second Circuit "emphasize[d]
• . . that in the future the appropriate action of the trial judge
faced with a similar request by a juror to reconsider a prior re-
corded partial verdict should be to advise the juror simply that
such a verdict is final. '229 But the propriety of the Second Circuit's
solution depends wholly upon the acceptability of its premise -
that recorded partial verdicts are final for all purposes. If the
Hockridge premise is incorrect, however, then another solution
must be devised.
The most appropriate solution - as well as the simplest and
most obvious - is for the trial judge to set aside the partial verdict
that is impeached and instruct the jury as a whole to redeliberate
as to the questioned verdict. There is no need whatsoever to de-
clare a mistrial with its attendant waste of resources, unless the
reason for impeachment justifies doing so.230 In the usual case, all
:28 573 F.2d at 760.
229 Id.
230 For a discussion of when a mistrial should be declared as a result of irregularities in
[Vol. 54:663
1980] PARTIAL VERDICTS
that is necessary is to allow the jury another chance. It is a solution
that has been followed in similar circumstances. 23
1
In the end of the problem of impeaching partial verdicts is a
problem of balancing. The nonimpeachment rule as applied to par-
tial verdicts is convenient. The Hockridge court evidently chose
convenience over other values. But there are other values, and con-
venience is a rather insignificant justification for precluding im-
peachment of partial verdicts.232 Until now, Hockridge has been
largely ignored. Yet, it has left much in the way of usable lessons
and enduring implications, and, if only for pedagogical purposes,
the problems it presents should not escape notice.
jury deliberations, see 6A J. MooRE, supra note 17, 59.08[4], at 59-125 to 143.
221 See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 488 F.2d 1093, 1094 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 948 (1974); United States v. Sexton, 456 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1972); Grace Lines, Inc. v.
Motley, 439 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1971); Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740, 746
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc); Cook v. United States, 379 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1967); Bruce v.
Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy, 126 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1942). Professor Wigmore ad-
vocates the same position:
[T]he judge, in his just and usual control of the proceedings, may refuse to accept
it [the verdict] as final and may require the jury to retire again to make the
verdict more specific or more clear. This procedure is a traditional part of jury
trial. In principle it is equivalent to holding the first utterance of the foreman as
tentative and informal only.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 48 § 2350, at 691-92 (emphasis in original).
232 In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973), the Supreme Court said "ad-
ministrative convenience" is "not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which" justifies gov-
ernment conduct. Id. See also 3 D. LouisELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 286, at 112
(1979) ("Convenience, however, is no justification for the [non-impeachment rule]. It runs
against the grain of a democratic society to sanction a deliberate attempt to hide from view
the imperfections of its institutions.").
